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Introduction 
Twenty years ago, at the outset of the internet revolution, much academic literature on the 
state of media and politics in advanced western democracies was preoccupied with various 
forms of negativity. This was especially true of studies on the US, which frequently framed 
the state of media/politics in crisis terms, with central elements of the democratic process 
apparently on the brink of failure. Typical narratives described how the mass media had 
followed the dictates of commercialism in dumbing down their political coverage and 
fixating over strategy and human interest storylines. The media’s obsession with the “horse 
race” features of political competition had become so entrenched that they were unable or 
unwilling to distinguish between routine governance and upcoming, often far off, elections.
2
 
Politicians were equally culpable; their campaigns having become excessively long and 
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divisive, with candidates trying to out-spend each other in a race to sling the most mud.
3
 The 
underlying logics of media coverage and the imperative of political point-scoring under the 
tyranny of public opinion were such that politicians were said to be “permanently” in 
campaign mode. No wonder large numbers of citizens lost interest in politics and allowed 
themselves to become enmeshed in entertainment. Preparing to choose a representative was 
too troublesome—and large segments of the American electorate failed to turn out to vote.4 
The disjuncture between democratic ideals and realities described by a generation of political 
scientists and communication scholars, had become, by the 1990s, a “disquieting gulf.”5 
Since those dying days of the broadcast era, after the popularization of cable TV but before 
widespread access to the internet, the media ecologies in advanced democracies (and many 
non-democracies) have undergone revolutionary changes. Near universal mobile device 
ownership and access to the internet has had a radical effect on modes of political 
communication. But have these changes in the information and communications environment 
exacerbated or reduced the “disquieting gulf”?  
 
Negativity 
A cursory glance at contemporary academic work suggests that in the digital era media 
coverage of politics is superficial, obsessed with image, laissez-faire and worse with “the 
facts,” exaggerated, misleading, guilty of “churnalism” and pseudo-news that adds nothing of 
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substance to the information environment.
6
 A glut of media content means that our daily lives 
are constantly disrupted by the flow of mediated events where “the adversarial and “gotcha” 
styles of commercial journalism” make the world seem more threatening and duplicitous than 
it really is, reducing public trust and darkening the public mood.
7
 Reflecting on contemporary 
media practices Keane describes how journalism “loves titillation, draws upon unattributed 
sources, fills news holes, spins sensations and concentrates too much on personalities.”8 
Keane doesn’t, but many critiques of prevailing media conditions, in academic and popular 
narratives, invoke nostalgia for a more innocent time, usually the early era of mass 
broadcasting. They despair at trends in the news media that began in the 1970s and 80s when 
high demand for content from the new 24 hour news channels and the dominance of 
“strategic” and “conflict” frames post-Watergate drove media practices.9 Forgetting earlier 
iterations of media negativity and sensationalism (the terms muckraking and yellow 
journalism were invented to describe the New York publications of Joseph Pulitzer and 
William Randolph Hearst at the turn of the 20
th
 Century), structural accounts of the evolution 
of the media environment in the US typically run as follows.
10
 Technological advances 
lowered production costs as levels of disposable income increased, leading to the near 
universal affordability of TV sets by the late 1960s. Increasing demand led to an exponential 
increase in cable/satellite penetration and concomitant expansion of commercial channels. 
Fragmentation of the national TV market exposed broadcasters to intense market competition, 
with literally hundreds of channels, including nascent 24 hour news channels, competing for 
ratings and advertising revenue. As a result of these commercial pressures, TV moved away 
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from issue-oriented “hard news” and analysis in favour of “infotainment” and “soft news” 
formats with greater mass appeal. By compelling broadcasters to present trivialized, 
personalized and de-contextualized coverage marked by the dominance of action over 
process and visualization over abstraction, Curran writes that the market undermined 
intelligent and rational debate.
11
 Similarly, Patterson argued that market competition created 
a situation where “the chief goal of the media is not to foster a free marketplace of ideas, but 
to attract and hold a large audience for advertisers.”12 Rather than constituting a civic forum 
encouraging pluralistic debate, public learning and participation in politics (as many have 
suggested it should),
13
 scholars found the opposite. By the early 1990s Patterson was already 
arguing that the progressively blurred distinction between news and entertainment had 
significantly diminished citizens’ ability to distinguish “reality” from “performance.”14 By 
the end of the decade Gunther and Mugham concluded that the news media’s emphasis on the 
“horserace” (who’s ahead? who’s behind?) forced voters to “make choices on the basis of 
criteria that are unrelated to the real business of government.”15 
Alongside this structural account, a corollary cultural explanation for media evolution 
focused on the repercussions of the Vietnam War and protests and fallout from the Watergate 
scandal. These events marked the apotheosis of the media as “watchdog” and precipitated a 
fundamental form of “adversarial journalism” and “anti-politics” orientation of the press.16 
Post-Watergate news coverage is noted for the increasing dominance of conflictual and 
strategic frames in which politics in general, not just electoral politics, is interpreted as a 
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game in which politicians vie for power. In this strategic schema,
17
 winning and losing is the 
central concern, depicted with the language of war, metaphors from sports and preoccupation 
with opinion polls. Politics becomes a story with its own performers, critics and an audience 
who will decide on the respective merits of the candidates’ narratives with their votes. The 
image, style and perception of the candidate often render their stand or record on “the issues” 
irrelevant.  
Social scientists, and indeed journalists, have long warned about developments in the 
media and the negative effects they may have at the mass level.
18
 Concerns have been 
particularly resonant when it comes to potential exposure effects on voters. In one early study, 
Lang and Lang found that watching TV news led to voter cynicism as a result of over-
emphasis on political conflict.
19
 Robinson, who coined the term “video malaise”, found 
similar feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration among voters exposed to TV coverage of 
politics.
20
 More recently, scholars found that “media attention to scandal leads to public 
belief that politicians are corrupt.”21 Many researchers in the 1990s appeared to share the 
worry that “the conflict-driven sound-bite oriented discourse of politicians and conflict-
saturated strategy-oriented structure of media coverage” combined to create a “mutually 
reinforcing spiral of cynicism.”22  
Among other things, the changing nature of media coverage created the impression, 
that election campaigns (and by extension, all politics) had become progressively negative. In 
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fact what happened, starting with the 1988 presidential campaign between George Bush Sr. 
and Michael Dukakis, was a significant increase in media attention to the negative aspects of 
political competition. In other words, negativity itself became news.
23
 The supposed 
degeneration of standards after 1988 was therefore an illusion, albeit a powerful and 
entrenched one that to a certain extent became the conventional wisdom. Here, as elsewhere, 
the media’s power in “culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited 
number of messages that reach people every day” distorted reality. 24  Another prevalent 
example of this is how TV news’ “problem frame” highlighting distress and suffering leads to 
erroneous impressions among viewers about real-world levels of danger and violence.
25
 
Soroka’s analysis of crime news coverage compared to actual crime rates in the US shows 
this negativity bias at work—crime stories are more frequently reported than the crime rate 
would suggest, with a tendency to exaggerate the frequency of violent crime, and to give 
more space in accordance with the degree of violence.
26
 Soroka found a similar dynamic in 
coverage of the economy in US, UK and Canadian newspapers: Overall, one mildly negative 
piece of economic news resulted in an average of two news stories based on it. By contrast, 
an average of two pieces of positive information would have to emerge to produce one 
story.
27
 To probe the ingrained idea that “bad news sells”, Soroka then coded the front covers 
of Maclean’s, Canada’s leading news weekly, and compared them to sales data controlling 
for the focus of the story and a number of other variables. Issues with negative front covers 
sold more copies by a very substantial margin. 
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Seeking an explanation for media negativity, Soroka goes beyond structural and 
cultural accounts. He argues that the media, as an institution designed by humans for human 
consumption, reflect an innate, evolutionary human tendency toward negativity. Negativity is 
a hardwired part of the human experience and the media’s predilection for negativity reflects 
the inherent bias of journalists, editors and audiences. People have evolved to focus on 
negative information (danger signs, for instance) because it increases their chances of 
survival. Much of the first part of Negativity in Democratic Politics marshals findings across 
many diverse disciplines to show how central, and “normal”, negativity is to the human 
experience. The consensus in the vast psychology literature on the topic is that negative 
information, events and assessments have more substantial effects on peoples’ behaviour than 
positive information. Human judgments privilege negative inputs, while work on information 
processing shows that greater cognitive energy is expended on negative experiences, which 
we’re also more likely to remember (to the extent that fearful events triggering danger signs 
can leave indelible memories). Research on neurological processes shows that negative 
stimuli generate greater responses, which are mirrored in physiological reactions such as 
“fight or flight” reactions to negative events. In sum, “the inside of the body is basically a 
source of evaluative negative input.”28  
Research in the social sciences shows some of the practical consequences for human 
behaviour. In microeconomics, prospect theory provides a convincing explanation for the 
many empirical manifestations of loss aversion, the phenomenon where people care more 
about a loss in utility than they care about an equal gain in utility.
29
 In political science the 
vast literature on negative campaigning has shown that people are more likely to remember 
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negative advertisements.
30
 Whether or not negative ads “work” in the way that their sponsors 
intend is hard to say, but there is convincing evidence that “negative campaign ads are more 
likely to stimulate and inform.”31 The attention-grabbing power of negative ads, to take one 
example, is a function of the relative scarcity of negative information. In our daily lives we 
are exposed to a lot of information, most of which does not concern politics and most of 
which is relatively positive. Thus when we encounter political or other news in all its 
negativity, it strikes us more forcefully. Again, Soroka finds an answer in our genes: 
“evolution favours animals that exhibit a combination of mildly optimistic and loss-averse 
behaviours. You have to be willing to try new food sources [but] if your friend gets eaten 
while you are there, you need to be the animal that never goes back.”32 As in frequency-
weight theories and loss aversion in economics, expectations play a key role: We give greater 
weight to information that goes against our expectations. For instance, negative changes in 
the economy matter less when the economy is already performing badly. More formally, “the 
negativity bias is reduced when the information environment becomes predominantly 
negative [which] helps explain why we are not endlessly negative—at some point, when 
things are particularly bad, we start focusing on the positive.”33  Negativity in American 
media/politics, as Riker’s account of the debate to ratify the American Constitution 
demonstrates, long precedes Watergate and Cable TV.
34
 Soroka’s convincing alternative to 
structural and cultural explanations of negativity suggests that is exactly as it should be.    
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Hybridity 
Digital communications have had a radical and disruptive effect on all aspects of media 
production and consumption, including of course political communications. In the space of a 
decade or so, terms like virtual reality, multimedia, saturation, digital natives, quick time, 
space shrinking, going viral etc. have become part of the lexicon as static, desk-based 
computing via a fixed internet connection has given way to mobile. Advanced economies, 
and some emerging economies like China that moved directly to mobile computing, have 
witnessed the extraordinarily rapid penetration and adoption of smart phones and Wi-Fi. The 
speed and scale with which people have accepted using their phones to consume and create 
all manner of digital communication and digital media are remarkable. With the 
popularization of Wi-Fi and handheld devices, “print”, “broadcast” and digital media are now 
available anywhere at any time. It has given rise to “a new world system of overlapping and 
interlinked media devices” that is characterized by “spectrum abundance, fragmented 
narrowcasting and less predictable “long tail” audiences.” 35  Ubiquitous connectivity has 
created the conditions for what Keane calls “communicative abundance”, which he defines as 
the high intensity use of multimedia in people’s daily lives enabling “messages to be sent and 
received through multiple user points, in chosen time, either real or delayed, within 
modularised and ultimately global networks.”36 Accordingly, the “tyranny of distance and 
slow time is abolished […replaced by…] non-stop acts of mediated quick time 
communication with others.”37 Not only are people “awash in vast oceans of circulating 
information,”38  as broadcasters become more adept at offering “customizable, personally 
tailored modes of consumption and interaction,”39 they are awash in very discrete types of 
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information that foster echo chambers and the balkanization of the internet. Prior suggests 
that abundance of choice may have another unintended negative effect on the electorate.
40
 He 
argues that inadvertent exposure to television news during the broadcast era prior to the 
emergence of cable TV, when viewers could only watch what was broadcast on the terrestrial 
networks, had a powerful effect on turnout and political moderation. In the “low choice” 
environment, selection of preferred content was inefficient, exposing “switchers,” (i.e. 
viewers who favoured entertainment to news, but preferred any genre to turning the TV off) 
to political information. A lack of alternative options forced “switchers” to watch the evening 
news because there was literally nothing else on. Learning from this accidental exposure 
often made the difference between the less engaged going to the polls or not. The 
contemporary, ultra-high choice media environment allows everyone to efficiently access 
whatever they like without ever accidental exposure to political information.
41
 Prior’s 
convincing claim that inadvertent exposure to political information has receded in the high 
choice information age is outweighed by more widespread concerns about the effects of 
information overload. As Ansolabehere and Iyengar reported in the mid-1990s, information 
overload among less sophisticated citizens leads them to “tune politics out.”42 Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse have similarly found that “the last thing people want is to be more involved in 
political decision making,”43 which is particularly true of low sophisticates.44 In need of a 
heuristic to help cut through the mass of information produced by communicative abundance, 
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Soroka suggests that our natural negativity bias may actually be our most effective tool (2014: 
121).
45
  
For media and political actors, the past decade has been a time of proliferating 
“disruptive” digital communications, “a chaotic transition period” in which “complex and 
multifaceted forces [are] reshaping the political communication environments of the western 
democracies.”46 In the beginning, their responses were scrambling and ad hoc, presenting 
openings to non-traditional actors, like bloggers, for instance. But over time, older power 
dynamics have adapted and traditional power holders have re-grouped and reasserted 
themselves under the new conditions of “communicative abundance” and “media hybridity”. 
In its simplest guise, media hybridity refers to the way in which “the high density of daily 
communication is reinforced by the tendency of each formerly separate medium to merge 
with others, to become “hybrid” media.”47 Chadwick goes much further, showing how the 
roles and effects of newer and older forms of media in politics (note the use of relative 
adjectives) have given way to entire media systems that, in the US and UK at least, are best 
characterized as hybrid.  
Chadwick is an advocate of a broad definition of media to counteract the bifurcation 
of the field into scholars of “traditional media” (who tend to discount the digital) and scholars 
of “digital media” (who are internet centric and tied up in utopian/realist debates) in a world 
where the key to understanding the media-politics ecology is the interrelationship between 
older and newer media. Advocating a broad conceptualization of the media system, 
Chadwick argues that instead of a singular “media logic” we need to think in terms of hybrid 
media logics in the plural. The media logic concept was developed by Altheide and Snow,
48
 
as a way of identifying how “the assumptions, norms and visible artefacts of media, such as 
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templates, formats, genres, narratives and tropes have come to penetrate other areas of social, 
economic, cultural and political life.”49 Over time media logic shapes the practices of those in 
other (Bourdieuean) “fields”, and the borders between fields are broken down. For instance, 
media coverage of sports, terrorism and war has shaped how actors in these fields behave.
50
 
In politics, the merging of news and entertainment into the “infotainment” formats that 
dominate news programing internationally is one example.
51
 More fundamentally, “the 
discrete interactions between media elites, political elites and publics create shared 
understandings and expectations about what constitutes publically valued information and 
communication”, to the extent that actors who seek to influence public discourse “must adapt 
their communication strategies to fit the dominant formats required by the media.”52 
For Chadwick, the hybrid media system is constituted by complex and ever-evolving 
interactions among older and newer media logics (incorporating technologies, genres, norms, 
behaviours and organizational forms) characterised by adaptation, interdependence and 
simultaneous concentrations and diffusion of power. In practice, hybridity minimizes or 
disguises dichotomies between professional and amateur, traditional and digital media, and is 
characterised by complexity, interdependence, transition, heterogeneity, flux, liminality and 
the “blending, meshing, overlapping and coevolution of media and politics.” 53  It is 
symbolised by the culture of hacking and the mash-up. It is easy to see the fearful challenge 
that this presented to political actors. Soroka, for instance, notes how politicians’ “words are 
chopped up and reshuffled to produce a narrative determined not by the source but by the 
journalist.”54 The trend that Hallin reported in the early 1990s—the declining average length 
of politician sound-bites on network news from 43 seconds in 1968 to 9 seconds in 1988—
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has continued, so that the words of politicians no longer dominate news stories as they once 
did.
55
  
One arena where politicians have fought back against this loss of control is in their 
election campaigns. As Chadwick demonstrates through a careful and detailed analysis of 
Barack Obama’s campaign for President of the US in 2008, successful campaigns now 
deliberately incorporate tools associated with both the older broadcast era and the current 
hybrid age.
56
 It is worth citing at length Chadwick’s summation of the landmark Obama 
campaign, which  
“simultaneously constructed and ruthlessly exploited the hybrid media system for the 
purposes of campaign communication […] the campaign clearly saw the internet as a 
tool for mobilization and the coordination of face to face activity such as canvassing 
and voter registration and mobilization. But the internet was not understood as a 
means of replacing TV and newspapers […and…] the internet campaign would be 
tightly managed to ensure that it was fully integrated with the other divisions. Online 
interactivity, while encouraged, would, as much as possible, be on the campaign’s 
own terms and harnessed in a way that fitted with this hybrid campaigning model. 
Obama’s campaign was a calibrated and controlled response to long-term trends in the 
fragmentation of mediated politics. And yet 2008 also revealed the continuing 
importance of physical gatherings and big TV events. The theatrical, the grandiose, 
and the televisual endure in importance. Televised debates, ads, newspaper interviews, 
web videos and high profile TV appearances increasingly meshed together to create 
new campaign dynamics.”57  
 
The effects of the hybrid media system have been felt in many spheres not just election 
campaigns, and not just in the US. Consider, for instance, WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, 
Occupy Wall Street activists and the democracy supporters in Egypt watching themselves on 
big screens hoping that the media coverage being beamed around the world would save them 
from the repercussions of their demonstrations. Consider how the “Occupy [Wall Street] 
activists hybridized real-space physical presence, with their own instantaneous social media 
resources and publishing channels—flows of information that they knew would be monitored 
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and reassembled by professional journalists eager to create authentic representations of their 
protest camps.” 58 Activists have learned and adopted practices from broadcast media to 
exploit the porous boundaries in the hybrid media system, but the same kind of adaptation 
works the other way too. Consider FOX News host Glenn Beck’s rally in Washington DC to 
“restore honor”; later emulated by Daily Show host Jon Stewart and (at the time) The Colbert 
Report host Stephen Colbert’s “rally to restore sanity and/or fear”. Both events attracted tens 
of thousands of participants by issuing appeals on their TV shows and online. As Chadwick 
puts it, “the nature of mediated politics is evolving rapidly and is being pushed and pulled in 
multiple directions by multiple actors: Some of these forces are contradictory, some are 
integrative, all are generative of systemic hybridity.”59  
Communicative abundance and media hybridity have broken down the traditional 
barriers between the media and other spheres of life. As Keane puts it, “from the most 
intimate everyday mileaux through to large scale global organizations [all] operate within 
heavily mediated settings in which the meaning of messages is constantly changing and often 
at odds with the intentions of their creators.”60 The same goes for the media, now that the 
horizontal interactions of social media means that “some big political news stories now break 
first online and are picked up by TV and print journalists who obsessively follow their email, 
Twitter, Facebook and blog feeds in the hunt for new leads.”61 And while the effects of cost-
cutting measures prompted by the decimation of traditional media business models has 
undermined their authority, a new class of independent creators emerged—political 
commentators like the blogger Paul Staines (penname Guido Fawkes) who “regularly 
produce articles that are indistinguishable from those published in the op-ed sections of 
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newspapers.” 62  Again, boundaries are blurred and evolving, and after an uncomfortable 
period of adjustment older power dynamics have reasserted themselves. In the US, successful 
political bloggers have been hired by campaigns, interest groups, government agencies and 
traditional media. In short, “they have been appropriated by all elite sectors of public 
communication in the US, from politicians and agency officials to professional journalists to 
TV and radio presenters.”63 In the UK too, bloggers like Staines have been incorporated into 
the “reserved domains of power” of the older news media, which “remain deeply embedded 
in the routines and insider networks of Westminster, Whitehall and the major metropolitan 
centres.”64 Despite the supposed democratization of information, where everyone has the 
potential to create and disseminate content, it is “newspaper journalists working in well-
equipped and well connected newsrooms [who] remain the content engines of talkback radio, 
TV news shows and blogs and tweets.” 65  Established media organizations have the 
experience, human and capital resources to out-perform newer media in terms of editorial 
authority, sophisticated delivery platforms and participatory web environments. It was 
“traditional” print media that broke the Snowden leak.66 Julian Assange’s decision to bypass 
traditional media and dump WikiLeaks material en masse online meant that “the cables have 
never had the dedicated attention they deserve. They made a splash and then were left 
languishing.”67 
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Negativity, Abundance and Democracy 
Information is a necessary commodity for representative democracy to function effectively.
68
 
If elections are conceived as the means by which the “will of the people” is expressed 
through the selection of candidates or parties that best represents the majority, or plurality, of 
voter’s interests, 69  then the role of voters is to choose the party or candidate that best 
represents their interests. For this to be possible, voters must have some awareness of their 
own preferences and sufficient relevant knowledge of the contending candidates.
70
 If citizens 
in a democracy should be enabled and encouraged to communicate their preferences in 
favour of particular policies or to reward or sanction incumbents for their performance, it 
follows that sufficient relevant information should be made available to them. In short, “in an 
ideal representative democracy plentiful and reliable political information should be readily 
available to allow citizens to make informed political decisions.”71 The acknowledgement 
that “information matters” has prompted several political scientists to argue that even 
unseemly elements of current political competition, such as negative campaigning, may have 
a constructive role.
72
 Indeed Soroka suggests that “focusing on negative information may be a 
perfectly reasonable means for citizens to monitor their environment, and particularly their 
governments.” 73  Not only is negative information a useful heuristic for an increasingly 
crowded information environment, it is consistent with the human predilection for negativity 
and the way in which a wide range of cultural and social institutions have been designed to 
privilege negative information. Consider, for instance, the checks and balances built in to 
most democratic systems. As Soroka puts it “representative democracy has been to a large 
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extent about giving power to govern to one group and then surrounding that group with as 
many checks and balances as are necessary to minimize error.”74 The consequence of this 
emblematically human institutional design is that political information is predominantly 
negative: only the government of the day actually produces positive information, while all 
other actors are obliged (and incentivised) to produce negative information. The end result of 
“the need for constant error monitoring [is] that everyday politics is rather negative.”75 The 
media are negative because they were designed to fill this role: Negativity “reflects one of 
their principal institutional functions in a democracy: holding current governments 
accountable.”76 
 For Keane, communicative abundance generated by the democratization of 
information, cheap methods of digital reproduction and the increase in number of people with 
the gadgets they need to access open information banks promised to have a fundamental 
effect on the extent to which citizens can monitor governments. Indeed in the early phase of 
the era of communicative abundance, “politicians [were] sitting ducks.”77  But of course, 
companies and government have fought back, often in cahoots with older, established media. 
As Chadwick observes, “the practices of [older] media and political actors become so 
interpenetrated and the alliances between them so strong that the disruptions caused by the 
emergence of newer media affect the status and power of both media and political elites.”78 
Both have the incentive to adapt together to the new conditions, by slowly colonizing 
cyberspace and in continuing to manipulate and control public opinion through the media. 
Yet Keane argues that something much more fundamental is happening to our democracies, 
“an historic sea change, one that it taking us away from the assembly-based and 
representative models of democracy of past times towards a form of democracy with entirely 
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different contours and dynamics.” 79  In previous work, he has conceptualized this new 
phenomenon as “monitory democracy.”80  
Key to the emergence of monitory democracy are several trends emanating from the 
architecture of communicative abundance: the democratization of information, the 
politicization of the private-public distinction, high intensity efforts by citizens and 
organizations to attack power holders with publicity and public exposure; the multiplication 
of unelected representatives etc. The upshot of these developments is that “within all 
democracies many hundreds and thousands of monitory institutions now skilfully trade in the 
business of stirring up questions of power, often with political effect.” 81  By putting 
politicians, parties and governments “permanently on their toes, monitory institutions 
complicate their lives and question their power and authority, often forcing them to chop and 
change their agendas—sometimes by smothering them in political disgrace.” 82 The 
routinization of “-gate” scandals, demonstrates that these “public monitors” work (to what 
extent we don’t really know), and also reminds us that “the political dirty business of 
dragging power from behind the curtains of secrecy remains fundamentally important.”83 
Revelations of malfeasance entrenches the idea in peoples” minds that all institutions must be 
viewed suspiciously—a kind of cynicism that Keane argues is healthier than the conceit of 
the “informed citizen” who knows everything he needs to about politics—an anti-democratic 
idea from 19
th
 Century used to promote a restricted educated franchise. Keane 
euphemistically conceives these cynics as “wise citizens” and imbues them with street smarts:  
“[they] know they have to think for themselves, keep an eye on power holders but also know 
that sometimes power monitoring doesn’t work or backfires […and…] they know they 
                                                          
79
 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, p. 79. 
80
 John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 
81
 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, p. 47. 
82
 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, p. 81. 
83
 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, p. 49. 
19 
 
should be sceptical and that in the age of paparazzi and Photoshop, the camera often lies.”84 
Keane sees the tools of communicative abundance (and media hybridity) as harnessing the 
“wisdom of crowds”, where “wisdom” resembles cynicism and street smarts, to continuously 
question and scrutinize power holders. Reversing Orwell’s dystopian vision to turn the 
panopticon against the state, Keane suggests “the constant public scrutiny of power by many 
differently sized monitory bodies with footprints large and small makes it the most energetic, 
most dynamic form of democracy ever,”85 where “potentially all fields of social and political 
life come to be publically scrutinized […] by a whole host of non-party, extra-parliamentary 
and often unelected bodies operating within, underneath and beyond the boundaries of 
territorial states.”86 No wonder he writes that “politics in the age of monitory democracy has 
a definite “viral” quality about it.”87 
The potential Keane foresees in current developments are much more fundamental 
than the meanings normally attached to “going viral” (think BuzzFeed memes and YouTube 
videos), to the extent that the central tenet of representative democracy (one person, one vote, 
one representative) becomes one person, many interests, many voices, multiple votes, 
multiple representatives under the evolving system of monitory democracy. Keane writes that 
“in the era of monitory democracy it is as if the principles of representative democracy—
public openness, citizens” equality, selecting representatives—are superimposed on 
representative democracy itself.” 88 This is exhilarating stuff. But lest we get ahead of 
ourselves, he cautions that, like any other political system, monitory democracy is not 
inevitable. The potential for monitory democracy fostered by communicative abundance is 
already being undermined by the co-optation of the same technologies, via the manipulations 
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of information by commercial oligopolies’ secret algorithms, 89  the normalization of 
surveillance and the dissolution of privacy,
90
 hacking, disinformation, deception and 
dissimulation. Instead of promoting tolerance and diversity, the infrastructure and tools of 
communicative abundance “hands out mirrors to citizens, who use them to preen themselves 
in the looking glass of their blinkered choice.”91 It leads to virtual mob rule, witch hunts, 
dogmatism, irresponsibility and “rabbit holes of special interests.”92 It leads to disorientating 
“information cascades” that overwhelm people with rumours, trivia and spin,93 where the “the 
cult of the amateur” triumphs94 and anonymous online interactions take the form of “random 
shouting.”95 More worrying still, is another manifestation of media decadence; “the great 
public silences produced by large-scale adventures of power” the catastrophes caused by 
“long strings of wilfully blind miscalculations”, that go by the name of Lehman, Deepwater 
Horizon, Fukushima etc. and have become commonplace.
96
 Equally pernicious is the silence 
that surrounds the multiplying number of “slow motion catastrophes” like global poverty, the 
arms trade and environmental destruction that move too slowly, are too complicated or aren’t 
deemed newsworthy enough. Catastrophes are symptomatic of the failure of democracy, 
warnings that “silent exercises of arbitrary power by manipulative human beings- the absence 
of monitory democracy- have harmful effects on citizens.”97 Freedom of communication, 
abundance and muckraking, i.e. the components of monitory democracy, are crucial bulwarks 
against these abuses of power. Keane thus exhorts (“wise”) people to make a noise, to shatter 
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the silence that surrounds power holders and “to sound the alarm whenever they suspect that 
others are causing them harm.”98 
 Anyone who has been online recently will bear witness to the cacophony therein, but 
noise alone will not guarantee that power holders toe the line or are held to account. 
Governments sometimes (how often, we can only guess) escape censure, either by avoiding 
detection or through collusion with the media. Collusion is an ugly word; perhaps we should 
say that there is frequent contact and cooperation between journalists and politicians who 
work closely and need each other. Politicians need the media because they can give positive 
or negative coverage, and have the power to selectively cover and frame things as they like. 
But politicians make the laws that govern media operations and can grant or deny access to 
journalists who need scoops and content. Communicative abundance has not changed the 
reality that “journalists and politicians drink and dine together … bump into each other at 
gatherings, in shopping malls, airports and school grounds and at formal functions … they 
frisk and frolic and keep in touch; sometimes they share beds … their working habits 
coincide .. they think about similar things and talk to the same people often in tight circles of 
friends, sources, advisers, colleagues and former colleagues.”99 But these unavoidably tight 
connections have long been cause for concern—the fear of mediacracy predates the current 
digital age.
100
 
 
Conclusion  
Politicians, corporations and powerful actors in other sectors have long understood the 
importance of ‘controlling the message’, using the media to their benefit, or minimizing the 
damage of scandals and negative events. The technology may have changed, but the 
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underlying motivations of powerful interests are the same in the digital age as they have 
always been. As Keane puts it, “the techniques and tools of media-saturated societies are 
being used by powerful forces in ways that are having harmful effects on democracy.”101 This 
may sound dramatic until one considers the US under President Obama, the Nobel Peace 
Laureate who entered office so memorably as a beacon of hope (in large part by 
systematically and ruthlessly exploiting “democratizing” digital tools and media). For the 
first time in its history, the Committee to Protect Journalists felt compelled to issue a report 
on the US in 2013, heavily criticising President Obama’s “control freak administration”. 
Headed by a former editor of the Washington Post, the report stated that the “war on leaks 
and other efforts to control information are the most aggressive […] since the Nixon 
administration”, while noting the sophisticated use of digital media to control the message.102 
Obama’s attempts to control the agenda are symptomatic of the broader culture of spin that 
has given rise to a dissimulation industry.  In a piece for the Financial Times entitled “the 
invasion of corporate news”, Edgecliffe-Johnson cites the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
the effect that “for every working journalist in America, there are now 4.6 PR (public 
relations) people.”103 The incursion of PR into journalism is one thing, the broader culture of 
fear bread by the endless “War on Terror” is another. As Glenn Greenwald, the American 
journalist who helped bring Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA surveillance 
program to the world, puts it in his memoir: “a population, a country that venerates physical 
safety above all other values will ultimately give up its liberty and sanction any power seized 
by authority in exchange for the promise, no matter how illusory, of total security.” 104 
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Pervasive suspicion and the compulsive need to “know everything” in order to prevent 
another terrorist attack led by turns to the systematic surveillance of millions of citizens and 
the astonishing scale of violations perpetrated by the NSA program. After blowing the 
whistle on the program, Edward Snowden, who it appears was driven by noble intentions, 
was forced into uncomfortable exile. Eerily echoing Keane, in an email he wrote to the 
filmmaker Laura Poitras, Snowden averred that “in the end we must enforce a principle 
whereby the only way the powerful may enjoy privacy is when it is the same kind shared by 
the ordinary.”105 For Keane this is exactly what the promise of communicative abundance 
holds: “monitory democracy” carried out by savvy and cynical citizens in the all-seeing, 
always-on digital age. But as the Snowden affair demonstrated, there is considerable 
resistance from entrenched, powerful and threatened interests. For one thing, the potential for 
monitory democracy is being undermined by what Keane calls media decadence, the 
“troubling counter trends [that] encourage concentrations of cunning power without limit, so 
weakening the spirit and substance of public scrutiny and control of arbitrary power that is so 
vital for democracy.”106 Here, another “disquieting gap” has opened up, between the ideals of 
monitory democracy and the reality in which media are implicated in promoting “intolerance 
of opinions, stifling the public scrutiny of power and fostering the blind acceptance of the 
way things are heading.”107 As O’Hagan reminds us, “it was often journalists who opposed 
Snowden’s actions and hated what Greenwald was writing.”108  On Meet the Press, host 
David Gregory asked Greenwald “to the extent that you have aided and abetted Snowden […] 
why shouldn’t you Mr Greenwald be charged with a crime?” 109  Here was a journalist 
implying that a professional colleague should face prosecution for pursuing the truth at the 
discomfiture of the government. I began this essay by remarking on scholars’ pre-occupation 
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with negativity in the 1980s and 90s. Fears about negativity have receded, and indeed now 
appear rather quaint, but the intersection of politics and the media is still cause for concern. 
Since it involves powerful interests competing to maintain their power, it will always remain 
so. The emergence of communicative abundance and media hybridity has changed the nature 
of citizens’ engagement with political communications, but not the underlying dynamics.   
 
 
 
